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There is a strong movement toward legal abolition of fixed-age retirement in 
Canada. Quebec passed a special statute for that purpose in 1982. Human rights 
legislation has been interpreted to that effect in Manitoba and is tending in that 
direction in New Brunswick. Section 15 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms will probably have the same result for all of Canada, once it comes 
into effect on April 17, 1985. This poses a novel challenge to Canadian univer-
sities, for retirement of professors at 65 is well entrenched. Several factors justify 
the existing practice, including the institution of tenure, the professorial pay 
schedule, and the need for intellectual rejuvenation. However, the arguments are 
unlikely to prevail against judicial interpretation of the Charter and of human 
rights legislation. Thus universities should now consider the ramifications. 
Possible measures include facilitation of early retirement, modification of 
pension and benefit plans, and more systematic assessment of academic staff 
throughout their entire careers. 
RÉSUMÉ 
Il existe un fort mouvement visant à abolir l'âge légal obligatoire de la retraite 
au Canada. Québec a présenté une loi spéciale à ce sujet en 1982. La loi des 
droits de la personne a été interprétée à cet e f f e t au Manitoba et s'oriente dans 
cette direction au Nouveau-Brunswick. La Section 15 de la Charte canadienne 
des Droits et Libertés aura probablement le même résultat pour tout le Canada 
lorsqu'elle prendra e f f e t le 17 avril 1985. Cela pose un nouveau défi dans les 
univeristés canadiennes quant à la retraite des professeurs à 65 ans. De nombreux 
facteurs justifient l'existence de la pratique actuelle, incluant la permanence, les 
échelles de salaires et le besoin d'un rajeunissement intellectuel du corps profes-
t The research presented in this paper has been financially supported by the Social Sciences 
and Humanities Research Council of Canada. 
* Political Science, University of Calgary 
20 Thomas Flanagan 
soral. Cependant, ces arguments sont peu susceptibles de l'emporter sur l'inter-
prétation judiciaire de la Charte et de la loi des droits de la personne. Ainsi, les 
universités devraient dès maintenant en considérer les conséquences. Les mesures 
à envisager incluent la possibilité d'une retraite prématurée, la modification des 
régimes de pension et d'avantages sociaux et une évaluation plus systématique 
du personnel académique en cours dç carrière. 
It has become common to speak of retirement at a predetermined age as "com-
pulsory" or "mandatory retirement," but these terms are rather misleading 
(Sowell, 1980: 194). In very few cases is retirement at a certain age mandated 
or compelled by law. It normally rests upon freely bargained collective agree-
ments or upon employer policy connected with a pension plan. A fixed retire-
ment age is thus usually part of a package of terms and benefits which employers 
and employees have found acceptable in a particular industry. Retirement at a 
specified age means that the employer's obligation to employ a worker ends at 
that age. Properly speaking, compulsion enters the picture only when government 
legislates an age of retirement or forbids employers and employees to voluntarily 
establish one. Since the terms "mandatory" and "compulsory retirement" con-
ceal the true location of coercion, this paper will use the term "fixed retirement." 
From small beginnings at the end of the nineteenth century, fixed retirement, 
usually at age 65, grew to become a major social institution following World War 
II. Governments led the way by making 65 an age threshold for public pensions 
and other benefits. Public and private employers fell into line by creating their 
own pension schemes with payout commencing at 65. Fixed retirement and 
pension plans became standard policies for large employers in Canada, including 
universities. Although there were always some who fought the imposed necessity 
of retirement, resistance was minor until the 1970's when "ageism" began to be 
compared to racism and sexism. The new climate of opinion has led to legal 
changes which threaten to make fixed retirement a thing of the past for most 
employers and certainly for institutions of postsecondary education in Canada. 
This paper addresses three dimensions of the transformation through which 
universities are now moving: 1) the legal changes to which universities, like other 
employers, are subject; 2) the special circumstances which make a stronger 
theoretical argument for fixed retirement of academic staff in universities than 
for many other professions; 3) the creative responses which university adminis-
trators and staff associations can make to events. 
Recent Legal Developments 
The rise of resistance to "age discrimination" can conveniently be dated from 
the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 in the United States. Some sentiment 
was expressed at the time to include age along with race and sex as prohibited 
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grounds of discrimination, but instead Congress instructed the Secretary of Labor 
to study the question of age. The result was the Age Discrimination in Employ-
ment Act, 1967, which prohibited discrimination in employment against those 
between the ages of 40 and 65. These boundaries were put around age purposely 
in order to target the problem of older workers seeking employment and at the 
same time to exclude the issue of fixed retirement, for which 65 was by far the 
most common age trigger at that time. 
This precedent was quickly followed in Canada. Between 1969 and 1983, the 
federal government and all provinces introduced the concept of age. discrimina-
tion into their human rights legislation. To avoid impact on retirement practices, 
all provinces except Manitoba, New Brunswick and Quebec put a "cap" of 65 on 
their age provisions. The federal government left age undefined but accomplished 
the same objective by stating that fixed retirement was not a discriminatory 
practice if "an individual has reached the normal age of retirement for employees 
working in positions similar to the position of the individual."1 
Events in Manitoba broadened age discrimination to include fixed retirement. 
The first provincial Human Rights Act, passed in 1970, contained no reference 
to age. Age appeared for the first time in a wholly revised Act adopted in 1974. 
Although no upper boundary was put on age, there was almost certainly no 
intention to interfere with well established retirement practices. The issue was 
not even mentioned in government press releases or in the legislative debates 
surrounding the Act.2 Two cabinet ministers later said in public that the cabinet 
also had never contemplated that the Act would abolish fixed retirement (Roth-
stein, 1982: 78-79). The Act itself contained a rather ambiguously worded clause 
which may have been intended to sanction fixed retirement : 
7 ( 2 ) . N o p r o v i s i o n of s e c t i o n 6 o r of t h i s s e c t i o n r e l a t i n g t o age 
prohibits the operation of any term of a bona fide retirement, 
superannuation, or pension p l a n . . . .3 
The wording of this clause seems to have been inspired by a similar clause in the 
American ADEA which, after much controversy, was finally interpreted by the 
Supreme Court in 1977 as allowing fixed retirement.4 
However, the establishment of "legislative intent" in British jurisprudence 
depends more on construction of the statutory language than on reconstruction 
of the motives of the legislators. Individuals faced with retirement against their 
will almost immediately began to bring complaints of age discrimination to the 
Manitoba Human Rights Commission. One such complaint led to the path-
breaking board of adjudication decision of Derksen v. Flyer in 1977 that fixed 
retirement violated the Human Rights Act.5 This interpretation was also streng-
thened by a 1976 amendment which removed the word "ret irement" from s. 7(2), 
thus undercutting the argument that fixed retirement was a legal exception to 
the general prohibition of age discrimination.6 
Derksen v. Flyer did not have the immediate effect of putting an end to fixed 
retirement in Manitoba because the Human Rights Commission, under behind-
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the-scenes pressure from the provincial government, followed an internal policy 
of dealing with retirement complaints only in the rare instances where there was 
no pension plan (MHRC, 1975, 1976, 1978). The large employers that have 
compulsory retirement almost always have pension arrangements. However, this 
tactic could not work for long. The lawyers of Aubrey Newport, a recently retired 
provincial civil servant, forced the Commission to take his complaint in November, 
1978, by filing for a writ of mandamus against the Commission.7 When the 
Commission accepted the complaint but appeared to be moving sluggishly, 
Imogene Mclntire, a University of Manitoba professor threatened with imminent 
retirement, by-passed the Commission by taking her case directly into the courts. 
The Mclntire case resulted in 1981 in a decisive verdict, affirmed on appeal that 
same year, that fixed retirement was incompatible with the Human Rights Act 
even though it had been accepted in collective bargaining between the Univer-
sity and the Faculty Association.8 In quick succession, a series of related cases 
extended the principle to virtually all situations in the public and private sectors.9 
All had to bow to the Human Rights Act. The only point left to be determined 
is whether a provincial statute adopted subsequent to the Human Rights Act and 
allowing school boards to retire teachers at 65 is valid by virtue of this later 
passage.10 
Since 1973, New Brunswick has had an uncapped provision against age discri-
mination in its Human Rights Act, but it also has had an exemption for "the 
terms or conditions of any bona fide retirement or pension plan.11 Until recently, 
that province's Human Rights Commission did not take retirement complaints 
unless there was no pension plan, which effectively exempted most large em-
ployers (Croll, 1979: 144). 
However, the New Brunswick Human Rights Commission is now attempting 
to revise its practices. In 1981, the Commission took the complaint of Dr. Geza 
Kuun, a University of New Brunswick professor who did not wish to retire at 
the normal age of 65. Under pressure from the Commission, the University 
offered Dr. Kuun two more years of employment, on the explicit condition that 
he then retire. Dr. Kuun signed an agreement, worked two more years, then 
approached the Commission in 1983 with a new complaint. The tribunal estab-
lished to hear the case ruled that a collective agreement involving fixed retirement 
does not violate the New Brunswick Human Rights Act, and that in any event 
Dr. Kuun, in accepting a settlement of his earlier complaint, was estopped from 
complaining again in the same matter.1 2 The Commission has appealed the Kuun 
case and is hoping to receive similar complaints not involving the inconvenient 
fact of a prior settlement.13 
Alone among Canadian jurisdictions, Quebec has prohibited fixed retirement 
through unambiguous, special-purpose legislation.14 Effective October 1, 1983, 
it also added the phrase "age except as provided by law" to its list of prohibited 
criteria of discrimination.15 Elsewhere in Canada, commissions of inquiry have 
from time to time recommended the legislative abolition of fixed retirement, 
but no other provincial government has pushed ahead (Herzog, 1980; Walton, 
1980). 
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The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms 
Developments at the federal level have been more dramatic. In 1979, the Senate 
Special Committee on Retirement Age Policies (Croll Committee) recommended 
the "progressive abolition" of fixed retirement, raising the age one year at a time 
for five years, at which point it would be eliminated altogether (Croll, 1979: 39). 
This idea was not acted upon directly, but an even more radical approach was 
incorporated into section 15(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, 
which comes into effect April 17, 1985. This section reads: 
15.(1) Every individual is equal before and under the law and has 
the right to the equal protection and equal benefit of the law with-
out discrimination and, in particular, without discrimination based 
on race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental 
or physical disability.16 
Since the term "age" is not bounded in the Act, and since there is no saving 
clause referring to retirement plans, one may infer an impact on fixed retirement. 
Indeed, the federal Minister of Health and.Welfare has stated that s. 15(1) was 
intended to put an end to fixed retirement (Rothstein, 1982: 70). However, a 
number of legal questions will have to be resolved before fixed retirement in 
universities is finally abolished. 
First is the jurisdictional issue. According to s .32(l)(b) , the Charter applies 
" to the legislature and government of ea'ch province in respect of all matters 
within the authority of the legislature of each province." This probably renders 
ultra vires the legislation in Alberta which has established a fixed retirement age 
for professors.17 But generally in Canada retirement for professors rests upon 
provisions of unlegislated collective agreements. Is a university part of the 
"government" of the province within the sense of the Charter? The answer seems 
likely to be yes. Provincial governments incorporate universities under statute, 
appoint their boards of governors, approve their degree-granting programmes, 
and pay 90% of their costs. The status of universities will be decided in the con-
text of parallel litigation challenging fixed retirement in hospitals, public schools, 
and similar provincially funded institutions. 
Second, universities may attempt to exempt themselves by appealing to 
section 1 of the Charter: 
1. The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees the 
rights and freedoms set out in it subject only to such reasonable 
limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free 
and democratic society. 
This clause is terra incognita, and it is not easy to predict what the courts 
may do with it (Whyte, 1982). However, the word "demonstrably" means that 
the onus will be on a university to prove that its operations will be gravely impaired 
by the absence of fixed retirement. The closest analogy in existing human rights 
law is the "bona fide occupational qualification" (bfoq) recognized in most such 
legislation. Age discrimination, including fixed retirement, has been successfully 
defended in cases where public safety would be seriously jeopardized by faulty 
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performance and where, in the absence of a more exact mechanism of assess-
ment, age may be the best available proxy for predicting the likelihood of 
impairment. But the Supreme Court of Canada has said that a bfoq exemption 
from the general prohibition of age discrimination is not justified "where concern 
for the employee's capacity is largely economic, that is where the employer's 
concern is one of product iv i ty . . . . " 1 8 That is, an employer may not retire workers 
past a certain age merely because they are on average less productive or less inno-
vative. Some overriding public interest must be demonstrated. For example fixed 
retirement for judges might be defended as a way of preserving their political 
neutrality by protecting them from dismissal for cause, which might be more 
likely if governments could not count on their certain retirement (Rothstein, 
1982: 304). It seems unlikely that universities will be able to muster arguments 
of comparable urgency. 
Third, universities may be able to persuade their provincial governments to 
invoke the nonobstante provisions of s. 33 of the Charter: 
33(1). Parliament or the legislature of a province may expressly 
declare in an Act of Parliament or of the legislature, as the case may 
be, that the Act or a provision thereof shall operate notwithstanding 
a provision included in section 2 or sections 7 to 15 of this Charter. 
When the Charter was adopted, it was widely believed that the provinces, fearing 
the political consequences of a legislative override of "human rights," would 
hardly ever make use of s.33. In fact, Quebec has used it wholesale as an expres-
sion of contempt for constitutional amendments adopted against the wishes of 
the provincial government, and Alberta has announced it will use it to maintain 
its ban on strikes by provincial employees, should the courts decide this ban 
violates the "freedom of association" guaranteed by s.2(d) of the Charter. Only 
time will tell whether any province will risk an override on the less than crucial 
issue of fixed retirement. It is hard to believe that a provincial government would 
act only for the sake of universities, but one or more might do so to retain its 
retirement policies for the entire provincial public service. In such a case, univer-
sities might be carried along. However, the override is unlikely to be a lasting 
prop of fixed retirement since it must be renewed by the provincial legislature 
every five years. Sooner or later, it will come up for renewal when a different 
party, pledged to undo the work of the previous government, controls the 
legislature. 
The most plausible conjecture is that existing university retirement schemes 
will be widely challenged in litigation immediately after April 17, 1985. The 
complainants will probably win in court. Some islands of fixed retirement may 
survive through resort to s.33, but these will probably be few and will always 
be susceptible to repeal on short notice. 
Retirement and the University 
Fixed retirement has never been an issue for the self-employed and for those 
employed by small businesses. In such circumstances, those who work can readily 
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make individual decisions in close consultation with colleagues and employers. 
Fixed retirement has evolved as a way of solving the personnel problems of large 
organizations. In that setting, it must be presumed to have some utility, because 
a very large majority of such employers, both public and private, establish a 
retirement age along with a pension plan. Employers cling to these arrangements 
and have tried to defend them against government intervention (Howard, Peavy, 
& Selden, 1982: 238). 
Large employers see several advantages in a fixed retirement age. It spares 
them the expense and acrimony of documenting a dismissal for cause for older 
employees whose productivity may be declining. It allows them to design salary 
ladder systems knowing that retirement prevents increases from going on in-
definitely. And it enables them to advance the careers of younger men with 
some predictability, because they know when senior positions will be vacated. 
To procure these advantages, they are willing to sacrifice the positive contribution 
that might be made by some employees willing and able to work past normal 
retirement age. Even this loss is often avoided by provisions in the retirement 
plan for discretionary extensions or re-hiring. 
Against these gains to the employer the greatest argument is that fixed retire-
ment is a form of discrimination based on age and therefore out of place in a 
society committed to equal opportunity for all regardless of accidental or irrele-
vant personal characteristics. There is some difficulty with this argument since 
age is not an immutable characteristic like race or sex but rather a part of the 
life cycle through which all human beings pass. Just as we have special arrange-
ments for children, it may not be unfair or irrational to have special arrangements 
for those past a certain age, if the connection between that age and relevant 
employment characteristics is so strong that age becomes a reliable indicator of 
performance. But that crucial link is in fact rather weak. Systematic research as 
well as common observation suggests a wide variation in the rate of mental and 
physical, as compared with chronological, aging. 
Another way of stating the personal choice argument is that fixed retirement 
is a significant reduction in freedom for those affected by it. Even if the majority 
wishes to retire by that age anyway, a substantial minority is prevented from 
continuing. This seems a regrettable anomaly in a liberal society which tries to 
promote individual choice. 
At this abstract level, the argument seems impossible to resolve. How do you 
balance economic advantage against the value of human rights and individual 
choice? However, the problems come into clearer focus when we consider that 
organizations, like individuals, are highly variable in their requirements. There is 
scarcely any problem of fixed retirement among the blue collar work force of 
manufacturing industries because hardly anyone wants to continue hard, grinding, 
assembly-line work past 65. Military and quasi-military organizations like police 
forces have special problems because of their hierarchical structure and extensive 
differentiation of ranks. Promotion through the junior ranks depends upon the 
predictable retirement of senior officers. Different problems again rise when 
public safety is an issue. When hundreds of lives may be at stake, we want to 
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ensure that drivers and pilots are in top mental and physical condition. Thus 
arises the bfoq justification for fixed retirement. 
These reflections on the diversity of organizations suggest that the single-
minded demand that no one be required to retire at a specific age may be as 
inappropriate as universal fixed retirement. This leads to consideration of the 
unique situation of universities and their academic staff. 
The first special factor is the commitment to academic freedom embodied 
in the institution of tenure. In legal terms, academic tenure resemblesjob security 
provisions found in many contracts of employment (after a probationary period, 
dismissal may ensue only if the employer shows cause); but it is hedged around 
with such strong social and psychological supports that dismissal for cause rarely 
happens in Canadian universities. Mandatory retirement may be considered a 
reasonable concession by academic staff in return for such security of employ-
ment. Without retirement at a fixed age, academic tenure would be tantamount 
to a lifetime guarantee of employment, unless universities resorted to dismissal 
for cause more frequently. But frequent dismissal proceedings might well jeopar-
dize academic freedom, the protection of which is the prime function of tenure. 
The argument is very similar to that which justifies fixed retirement for judges 
as a support of their political neutrality. It is safer not to put the employer in 
the habit of launching dismissal proceedings. 
A second point is the remuneration schedule of North American professors. 
The rewards of being a professor can be considerable, but they are deferred. 
From a low starting level, salary increases indefinitely, at least for the more 
productive researchers. This means that peak earning power is generally achieved 
immediately before retirement. In most professions, older employees earn more 
than younger, but the difference is especially marked in the professoriate. This 
corresponds to the fact that academic work, particularly research, is a virtuoso 
performance comparable to that of athletes, artists, or entertainers. A salary 
structure which encourages and rewards the desired performance is a logical 
feature of university life. The university can afford to pay high salaries to the 
most renowned members of faculty in the knowledge that the burden will not 
continue indefinitely. These ultimate rewards are one inducement for capable 
young scholars to enter university teaching as compared to, say, school teaching, 
where the pay-off comes much quicker but also reaches an earlier plateau. An 
end to fixed retirement may upset the implicit bargain on which these arrange-
ments rest. 
A third point is the unusual need of universities for rejuvenation. This follows 
from the progressive character of modern science and scholarship. If the profes-
soriate did not discover new knowledge but only passed on the traditional learn-
ing of the past, older staff might almost automatically be better staff. But in a 
dynamic scientific community, new generations of scientists and scholars embody 
recent discoveries in knowledge and methodology. Older researchers will un-
doubtedly read about the latest advances, but they are unlikely to adopt them as 
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enthusiastically as the new generation learning them in graduate school. Fixed 
retirement seems to be a reasonable way of ensuring the necessary circulation 
of personnel. 
Finally, it is often asserted that the abolition of fixed retirement will have 
little practical effect on universities or other employers because relatively few 
employees wish to work past 65. A Conference Board of Canada study in 1979, 
using a rather simplistic methodology, estimated that only about 12,000 indivi-
duals a year in Canada are at present being retired against their will (Dunlop, 
1979: xiii). However, these aggregate statistics and predictions may not apply 
very well to the professoriate. Most academic work is not physically debilitating; 
rather it is often intensely interesting to those who do it. There are also important 
social rewards in teaching and in being part of the community of scholars. All 
these factors suggest that professors may be much less eager for retirement than 
are workers in many other occupations. 
Early data from the University of Manitoba give some indication of what may 
happen. Of 69 academic staff who retired from 1978 through 1983, 21 (30.4%) 
chose early retirement, 36 (52.2%) left at the "normal" age of 65, and 12 
(17.4%) elected to work past 65,19 Using slightly different definitions, 16 of 
1138 full-time academic staff, or 1.4%, were 66 or older in February, 1984. 
These figures are not large, but the main judicial decisions about fixed retire-
ment occurred as recently as 1981-82, and one case is still to be decided by the 
Supreme Court of Canada. As the idea of working past 65 becomes more familiar, 
it seems likely that a significant minority of professors will choose that option. 
Precise estimates would be foolhardy since retirement decisions are powerfully 
influenced by many extraneous factors such as adequacy of social security and 
private pensions, the expected rate of inflation, and common perceptions of 
what is normal. Under present Canadian tax law, not many professors would 
continue full-time employment past 70, for tax-exempt benefits may not accrue 
past 71 (Croll, 1979: 29). However, this barrier may well fall after 1985, since 
s.15 of the Charter will bring such age-triggered tax rules under attack. 
These reasons suggest that, even if fixed retirement is not absolutely necessary 
for universities, it is integrally related to a number of existing practices. When 
ADEA was passed in 1978, American universities lobbied Congress vigorously 
enough to win a temporary exemption; although ADEA raised the general age 
of retirement to 70, universities were allowed to continue to retire tenured 
academic staff at 65. This exemption, opposed at the time by the American 
Association of University Professors (AAUP), expired July 1, 1982, and was not 
renewed, so that universities now share the new norm of 70. Interestingly, the 
prestigious "Committee A" of AAUP has opposed recent proposals to "uncap" 
ADEA and thus abolish compulsory retirement altogether (AAUP, 1982). For 
reasons like the ones given above, the AAUP continues its original stance, voiced 
in its 1940 Statement of Principles on Academic Freedom and Tenure, of 
accepting fixed retirement in principle. 
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In contrast, the Canadian Association of University Teachers now favours 
legal abolition of a fixed retirement age coupled with maintenance of 65 as a 
"normal" age for retirement. 
CAUT in its submission to the Special Senate Committee on Retire-
ment recommended that compulsory retirement solely because of 
age should be abolished and that employees should be free to choose 
when they will retire subject, of course, to their continued ability to 
do their job. However, CAUT believes that the "normal" retirement 
age should continue to be 65 and that pension plans should be 
designed to provide a " fu l l" pension at that age for employees who 
have been members of a plan for most of their normal working life 
(CAUT, 1983). 
This position was developed by CAUT in 1979 as part of its submission to the 
Croll Committee (CAUT, 1979). 
The issues discussed above apply to universities in general. However, the retire-
ment question is made even more vexing by a peculiar conjunction of circum-
stances prevailing in the 1980's. Universities everywhere in Canada are under 
intense financial pressure as part of governmental attempts to control the cost 
of public services. University operating budgets are at best static, and more of ten 
declining, in real value. As always in a dynamic economy, student interest con-
tinues to shift from one field to another in unforeseeable ways. The institution 
of tenure prevents internal reallocation of resources through dismissal of faculty 
in declining areas. In this situation, retirements are inevitably prized by univer-
sity administrators as a way of simultaneously replacing an expensive employee 
by a cheaper one (replacement hiring at the junior level) and reallocating resources 
(transfer of positions from one department to another). Canadian universities 
expanded so rapidly in the late 1960's and early 1970's that the age structure of 
their teaching faculty is heavily weighted toward younger middle age. Statistics 
Canada compiled the following aggregate distribution by age of teaching faculty 
in 1982-83, excluding Quebec (University of Calgary, 1984): 
TABLE I 
Age Distribution of Teaching Faculty, 1982-83 
Age Percent of Staff 
under 31 
31 - 35 
36 - 40 
41 - 45 
46 - 50 
51 - 55 
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In the next five years, according to these figures, about 1 percent of faculty 
will reach 65 each year — say 10 professors annually in a medium-size university 
of 1000 faculty members. In actual fact, the number of vacancies to fill will be 
somewhat higher, because a few will die or become disabled, and others will 
choose early retirement. However, the numbers are low enough to raise concern 
among those who must balance budgets while simultaneously redirecting the 
university's efforts towards fields of emerging student interest. The dilemma is 
even more acute for the new universities which, beginning from nothing, hired so 
many young faculty members in the last two decades. For example, The Univer-
sity of Calgary, with about 1100 full-time positions, projects only 47 retirements 
in the five years from 1984 through 1988-(University of Calgary, 1984). 
The other side of this problem is the lack of opportunities for young scholars 
now emerging from graduate schools, a situation so familiar that it has become 
common to speak of an academic "lost generation." Canada's expansion of uni-
versities has created graduate programmes which stand on a world level of excel-
lence in many disciplines. Ironically, the best-trained generation of scholars in 
Canadian history faces a dreary round of sessional and limited-term appointments 
as its members scramble for the few positions available. Their prospects may 
become even dimmer after 1985 if a considerable fraction of those who would 
otherwise have retired by 65 now choose to prolong their employment. 
Recommendations for Universities 
The previous section has established that there are good reasons for the existence 
of fixed retirement in universities. Indeed, it seems unlikely that abolition of 
fixed retirement in universities would be legislated in many jurisdictions if the 
merits of the issue could be openly debated. One may differ as to whether the 
best age is 65 or 70 or something in between, but the principle that there ought 
to be a maximum age seems defensible in the context of university life. Nonethe-
less, universities are faced with abolition of their existing retirement rules as a 
consequence of broadly drafted "human rights" legislation. It would be wise, 
therefore, for universities, both administrative officers and faculty associations, 
to ponder their responses. Below are set forth some ideas which may be worth 
consideration. 
First, legal abolition of mandatory retirement is practically a fait accompli. 
The courts are very unlikely to interpret s. 15 of the Charter so as to save the 
practice for public employers or to sanction an exception for universities. Resort 
to legislative override may be possible in some provinces but will always be 
insecure because of the necessity for re-enactment every five years. University 
administrations may wish to test s. 15 in the courts or to lobby their provincial 
government; but if they do, they should realize their chances of success are not 
great. It would be wise to avoid extreme or inflammatory public statements 
which may alienate faculty or detract from the university's prestige by making 
it seem to be "against human rights." 
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Instead of fighting abolition outright, universities should perhaps save their 
legal and political energies for the battles over pensions and benefits which are 
bound to ensue. Most existing human rights legislation contains clauses exempting 
pension plans and/or insurance policies from the general prohibition of age dis-
crimination;20 but no such provision has been included in the Charter of Rights 
and Freedoms. No one can foresee at present the extent to which concessions 
to actuarial necessity may reappear as exemptions under s.l of the Charter 
(" . . .reasonable limits prescribed by law. . ."), as legislation based on the non-
obstante clause, or even as a future constitutional amendment to the Charter. 
While only skimming the surface of a complex subject, we can indicate two 
problems which will have to be considered: 
1) Pension plans currently use age triggers in a variety of ways. Two of the 
most common are that full benefits become available at a certain age, usually 65, 
and that early retirement becomes possible at a certain age, of ten 55. According 
to the same judicial logic which will construe mandatory retirement by public 
employers to be prohibited age discrimination, all such age triggers will be equally 
suspect. If a professor wants to retire early, why should he have to wait until 55, 
and why should he have to pay an actuarial penalty? 
A related question is what will happen to those who work past 65. Will they 
continue to make contributions matched by the employer, or will contributions 
cease? An arbitrary age threshold will no longer be acceptable. If university 
pension plans are held to be part of the public sector, they will have to be re-
written to remove all age triggers. Numerous controversies are bound to arise in 
the process. 
2) Universities commonly provide to academic staff a number of group 
insurance benefits, including life insurance, short and long-term disability benefits, 
dental and supplementary medical coverage. Typically, the university acts as an 
intermediary between its faculty members and a private insurer, while also sub-
sidizing the premiums to some degree. It will have to be determined in court 
whether such university programs are part of "government" in the sense of s.32 
of the Charter and therefore incur the prohibition of age discrimination explicit 
in s. 15. If so, universities may have to divorce themselves from such programmes 
and let faculty associations contract directly with insurers, as unions sometimes 
do in the private sector, or else insurers will have to devise age-neutral ways of 
distributing actuarial risk. The challenge will be greatest for life insurance because 
risk of death rises so sharply past 65. If those who work past 65 are held to have 
a right to continue in the group life insurance plan, and if substantial numbers of 
employees do in fact postpone retirement, the plan could be severely burdened. 
A similar actuarial problem will exist for disability benefits. 
Most of the pension and benefit problems will be technical in nature and will 
be solved by the ingenuity of actuaries and plan administrators (Walker & Lazer, 
1978). The university's long-term interest will be to ensure that adequate coverage 
is continued without creating artificial incentives for staff to continue employ-
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ment indefinitely (e.g. if an employee could indefinitely carry very large amounts 
of life insurance at a highly subsidized rate). 
Beyond the redesign of pension and benefit plans, there are some positive 
things that a university can do to ensure that personal choice retirement does 
not become detrimental to the institution. One step is to make early retirement 
as financially attractive as possible. This can be achieved by easing eligibility 
criteria, by removing actuarial penalties, and by offering lump-sum payments or 
annuities to help bridge a financial gap which may exist until the retiree is eligible 
for Canada Pension Plan benefits. However, caution must be exercised in this 
approach. Making early retirement universally available on favourable terms may 
entice some of the university's most talented staff to "retire" early in order to 
start another career or even to go to work for another university. From the 
standpoint of university administration, selective early retirement would be the 
ideal procedure, used to induce the early departure of the least productive staff. 
However, if early retirement becomes more common, faculty associations will 
surely wish to include it in their list of negotiated contract provisions, so admin-
istrative flexibility may tend to decline over time. 
Financial security is a major, but not the only factor in the retirement decision. 
Professors fear the loss of their academic identi ty: office and laboratory space, 
research support, relations with students and colleagues. Universities may be 
able to ease these fears, as well as make use of valuable expertise, by developing 
new kinds of relationships with retirees.21 Some may wish to be rehired on part-
time contracts to perform selected duties in teaching, research, or administration. 
Others may be content if they are ensured suitable office space and access to 
laboratories, libraries, or computers. 
On the negative side, universities will have to ensure that their performance 
appraisal systems are effective. One of the commonest propositions in the liter-
ature is that older employees are sometimes allowed to coast in their final years, 
since the employer knows they will leave at 65 (Gunderson & Pesando, 1980: 
356-357). If that departure is no longer guaranteed, it is necessary for perfor-
mance appraisals to be honest and realistic as long as employment continues. 
Again, the literature suggests that, given the prospect of financial security, 
employees will make realistic decisions about retirement if they are given realistic 
appraisals of their performance (Wallfesh, 1978: 36-37). 
The net effect of the end of mandatory retirement will probably be an increase 
in costs; The increase will be apparent in higher salary costs if continuation past 
65 for substantial periods of time becomes frequent. But there will be a less 
visible increase even if the empirical pattern of retirements is not much different 
from today's. What is now an automatic, predictable event will become a unique, 
negotiated occurrence. All retirements will become in effect early retirements, 
requiring an individualized package of pension benefits, lump-sum payment or 
annuities, and post-retirement concessions such as part-time rehiring. The aggre-
gate benefits will be costly to negotiate and costly to provide. Insurance-type 
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benefits may also become more expensive if insurers are forced to discontinue 
use of convenient proxies like age. In the very long run, these costs will be trans-
ferred to the professoriate, as a new salary structure will emerge to take account 
of the new advantages associated with the retirement decision. In the short run, 
the costs will have to be borne by universities, either through increased tuition 
fees or government grants, or through reduction of expenses in areas other than 
salaries for tenured faculty. In the real world, everything has a cost to be paid, 
even if human rights legislation often seems to presuppose that "equality of 
oppor tuni ty" is a costless manna from heaven. 
However, the increased costs may be offset by opportunities for increased 
academic quality. Fixed retirement was an expeditious compromise which 
allowed some unproductive employees to work longer than desirable while 
forcing others to retire while they still had a contribution to make. It thus en-
tailed deadweight losses in staff efficiency, even if it offered considerable savings 
in personnel management. Abolition of fixed retirement will open a new era in 
university affairs marked by more individualized treatment of faculty members. 
Both teaching and research will be improved if universities can find ways to help 
their faculty members make optimal choices about the duration of their employ-
ment and the precise form it takes in later years. 
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NOTES 
1. Canadian Human Rights Act, S.C. 1976-77, c .33, s. 14(c). Section 14 also contains 
several other less sweeping grounds on which fixed retirement may be justified. 
2. See Manitoba Government News Service, press release June 7, 1974, in the Library of 
the Manitoba Human Rights Commission. The Attorney-General, Howard Pawley, 
mentioned age when he introduced the Act into the Legislative Assembly, but only in 
the context of employment of older workers. Ret i rement was never ment ioned. See 
Legislative Assembly of Manitoba, Debates and Proceedings, June 1 ,1974, pp. 4212-4213. 
3. The Human Rights Act, S.M. 1974, c .65 , s.7(2). 
4. United Airlines v. McMann 434 U.S. 192 (1977). 
5. Peter Derksen v. Flyer Industries Ltd., 1977, unreported; copy in Manitoba Human 
Rights Commission Library. 
6. An act to amend the Human Rights Act, S.M., 1976, c .48, s .7(2). 
7. Interview with Jack R. London, Dean of Law School, University of Manitoba, Decem-
ber 14, 1983. 
8. Imogene Mclntire and The University of Manitoba, 2 C.H.R.R. (1981), d /310 
9. The leading Manitoba decisions and the issues raised are as follows (only final decisions 
are cited): Manitoba H.R.C. and John N. Finlayson v. City of Winnipeg et al, 4 C.H.R.R. 
(1983), D/1255 (bfoq); Douglas Paterson v. E.H. Price Ltd., 3 C.H.R.R. (1982) , D/904 
(private sector employer) ; Dwight Parkinson v. Health Sciences Centre, 3 C.H.R.R. 
(1982), D/724 (public sector employer); Government of Manitoba v. Aubrey Newport, 
3 C.H.R.R. (1982) , D/721 (statutory retirement age); Bedrich v. City of Winnipeg 
(1981) , unreported (city by-laws) Thexton v. University of Manitoba, 2 C.H.R.R. (1981), 
D/318 (collective agreement; non-academic employee of university). 
10. Craton v. Winnipeg School Division No. 1 et al. 21 Man. R (2) 315, on appeal to the 
Supreme Court of Canada. 
11. Human Rights Code, S.N.B., 1971, c.8, s.3(2) 
12. Geza Charles Kuun v. University of New Brunswick (1983) , unreported. 
13. Observation of New Brunswick Human Rights Commission Meeting, March 6, 1984. 
14. Loi sur l 'abolition de la retraite obligatoire, L.Q., 1982, c. 12. 
15. Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms, R.S.Q., 1977, c.C-12. s. 10, as amended 1982, 
c .61, s.3. 
16. Constitution Act, 1981, s. 15(1). 
17. Universities Academic Pension Act, S..4., 1978, c. 3 6 , 1 (g) and 9. 
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18. Ontario H.R.C. and Bruce Dunlop and Harold E. Hall and Vincent Gray v. The Borough 
of Etobicoke, 3 C.H.R.R. (1982) , D/781, at D/783. 
19. Letter to the author f rom Dr. S.L. Bond, Associate Vice-President, University of 
Manitoba, January 30, 1984. 
20. Canadian Human Rights Act, s. 14(d) ; British Columbia Human Rights Code, s . 8 ( 3 ) ; 
Saskatchewan Human Rights Code, s. 16(4); Manitoba Human Rights Act, s.7(2); 
Ontario Human Rights Code, s.21, 24(2) , 24(3); New Brunswick Human Rights Act, 
s. 3(6) ; Nova Scotia Human Rights Act, s. 11 B(3); Prince Edward Island Human 
Rights Act, s. 11; Newfoundland Human Rights Act, s .9(5) . 
21. The University of Manitoba is now considering a "senior scholar" plan to provide 
retirees with access to facilities. Interview with Dr. Sheryl Bond, Associate Vice-
President, December 14, 1983. 
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